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Transatlantic Cooperation in Financial
Regulation Post-2008
Eytan Schindelhaim
University of California, Berkeley

Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the international policy consequences of the 2008
global financial crisis by comparing the regulatory response in Europe to that in the United
States. Specifically, it accounts for the level of cooperation between the two jurisdictions in
their efforts to improve oversight of the financial system. The paper is concerned primarily
with the regulatory laws, agreements, and frameworks enacted since 2008, as efforts to improve financial regulation are ongoing and only starting to reach the implementation phases.
Still, implementation plays a meaningful role in the analysis, as variation in implementation
capacity among jurisdictions often shapes the breadth and depth of oversight.This paper also
seeks to demonstrate that international cooperation in financial regulation is constrained
by an incentive to defect, which arises from short-run negative effects of oversight on the
profitability of financial institutions. Finally, the paper shows that the sheer complexity of the
financial system, especially with respect to the derivatives market, is itself a hindrance to the
creation of transatlantic regulatory standards.
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Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis has presented a monumental regulatory challenge
across American and European financial markets. Based on the large-scale risk-taking from
which the financial breakdown ensued, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have since
endeavored to enhance macroprudential oversight of financial institutions. The goal of new
regulatory measures is to reduce the degree of systemic risk present in financial markets, so
that future disturbances in asset prices will be less likely to engender significant contagion
and disrupt the proper functioning of the financial system. To date, these efforts have included several pieces of national legislation, such as the Dodd-Frank Wall-Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act in the United States (2010), as well as international agreements
among G-20 members and international regulatory structures like the latest Basel Accords.
All together, these measures set out to improve aspects of the financial system ranging from
capital adequacy to derivatives trading, proprietary trading, securitization, and mortgage
markets, among many others. Each area presents considerable regulatory challenges at both
the domestic and international levels.
In this paper, I will focus on the level of transatlantic regulatory cooperation and the
extent of transatlantic convergence with respect to capital adequacy requirements, derivatives trading (particularly over-the-counter derivatives), and systemically important financial
institutions. These are a few of the most salient issue areas in regulation reform, based on
Dodd-Frank rulemaking activity1 and official G-20 communiqués (“G-20 Cannes Summit
Communiqué,” 2011; “Mexico City G-20 Communiqué,” 2012). Additionally, these issue
areas differ in the complexity of regulation, which allows for a comparison of the level of
international cooperation across topics that vary in difficulty of oversight.This will eliminate
the potential for bias that arises from selecting on issue areas for which regulatory cooperation is relatively simple or problematic.
In the first section, I will examine transatlantic cooperation in instituting new capital
adequacy requirements. I begin by framing the issue, describing the need for new measures
on capital adequacy and depicting what is at stake for the financial system. Then, I explain
why capital adequacy reform has seen a relatively high degree of international cooperation,
focusing on the standards stipulated by the third installment of the Basel Accords. Next, I
perform a similar analysis for derivatives regulation, first delineating the problem and then
evaluating policy convergence on the subject. With derivatives, cooperation takes the shape
of harmonization of domestic oversight between jurisdictions, rather than explicit international agreements. In the third section, I assess the extent of international policy convergence
that has taken place in relation to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Finally,
I will attempt to explain any disparities in the degree of cooperation observed across issue
areas, and evaluate the overall level of transatlantic convergence achieved in financial regulation to date.
For this analysis, I concentrate on the United States (US) and the European Union
(EU) as the world’s largest financial markets (World Federation of Exchanges: Statistics).
These are the areas that experienced the most financial distress resulting from the events of
2008. Moreover, these are the jurisdictions where the need for enhanced regulation is most
apparent.Though the analysis will exclude other potentially important regions (Japan, China,
Brazil, etc.), it is robust enough to draw meaningful conclusions regarding regulation of the
1 Based on Dodd-Frank and Related Reforms, Morrison & Foerster. Retrieved from http://www.mofo.com/
resources/regulatory-reform/.
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global financial system.
Financial Regulation in the Context of Transatlantic Relations
Once a close-knit entente cordiale, particularly in the early part of the Cold War era,
the vessel of transatlantic relations has in recent decades encountered a spot or two of uneven
seas. Although the United States and Europe have always retained very robust political and
economic ties, the strategic and economic interests of the two regions have grown somewhat
misaligned. The rift, though small, has become especially pronounced in the last decade, following the US-led invasion of Iraq and the global shift of power towards Asia (Tocci & Alcaro, 2012). In the realm of foreign policy, the United States’ “unilateral moment,” in which it
bypassed the United Nations in pursuit of war against Iraq, did much to anger the French
and Germans (Hanhimaki, Schoenborn, & Zanchetta, 2012). The subsequent debacle that
was the Iraq War did little to mollify European mistrust. In the economic sphere, the United
States and Europe have collaborated closely in the post-World War II period to bolster their
security community. This resulted in a highly successful economic partnership, characterized
by deep cooperation through programs like the Marshall Plan as well as institutions like
the Bretton Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Eichengreen,
1995). The recent rise of Asian economies, however, has weakened transatlantic commercial
interdependence to some extent by shifting the focus of American and European economic
policy. Asia has been increasingly capturing trade and financial flows that would have otherwise been part of transatlantic economic activity (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2012).
The 2008 crisis shook the very foundation of the global economy, bringing American
and European financial markets to their knees. The subsequent need for a new international
regulatory structure presented a major test for transatlantic relations. The ability of American and European policymakers to construct an effective regulatory system bears directly
on the future of cooperation between the two regions. Their capacity to restore the proper
functioning of financial markets will likely indicate the potential for a sustained economic
partnership as well as shed light on the feasibility of prospective initiatives such as a US-EU
free trade agreement.
Conceptual Approach
It is difficult to gauge the level of international cooperation in regulatory reform without first understanding its objectives. In other words, we must know what financial regulation seeks to achieve before we can evaluate its success thus far. Since there is no single
objective that regulators unanimously agree upon (particularly with the more complex
problems pertaining to derivatives and SIFIs), I will use a conceptual framework that rests on
“international consensus” (between the United States and EU member states). I argue that in
each of these three issue areas, an international consensus exists that, although broad, specifies a distinct set of policy goals. Based on this, I will assess the effectiveness of transatlantic
cooperation in realizing regulatory reform.
Section 1: Capital Adequacy
The 2008 financial crisis illuminated crucial structural flaws in the American and European banking systems with respect to capital reserves. In the aftermath, it became apparent that the capital requirements for banks in the United States and EU were inadequate
to ensure liquidity and prevent exorbitant risk-taking (Harle et al., 2010). This inadequacy
Transatlantic Cooperation in Financial Regulation Post-2008
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encouraged excessive credit growth and procyclical lending practices, while heightening
counterparty risk. As a result, regulators have seen the need to raise minimum capital requirements, as well as improve the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base.
Owing to the deep interconnectedness of the transatlantic banking system, capital adequacy regulation must be addressed at the international level. It is of little use to enhance
regulation in one jurisdiction if regulation in others is lax enough to allow risky practices
to continue. In such a situation, international transactions and contagion would undermine
increased oversight. Moreover, tightening regulation domestically without reciprocal policy
actions abroad creates a significant competitive disadvantage. Because stricter capital requirements generally lower bank profitability, domestic banks would become less competitive
relative to foreign banks in such a scenario. Therefore, enhanced domestic regulation can
be highly contentious and difficult to implement unless it is matched in other jurisdictions
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). An international framework is essential if
meaningful capital adequacy reform is to be achieved.
The central vehicle for the formation of international banking standards has historically
been the Basel Accords, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a division of the Bank for International Settlements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2009). The 2008 financial crisis prompted the latest series of agreements, known as Basel III
(2010-11), stipulating new requirements with respect to capital reserves and market liquidity.
This framework has been endorsed by the G-20 leaders and functions as the centerpiece of
international oversight coordinated by the Financial Stability Board (Hannoun, 2010). As
such, it marks a good starting point for the evaluation of transatlantic cooperation in financial
regulatory reform.
Basel III
In order to assess the magnitude of change stipulated by Basel III, I examine reports
of key industry commentators published in response to the new guidelines. I will make a
conceptual leap and claim that the profusion of such reports, which detail the impact of Basel
III on the banking industry, reflects a high degree of regulatory change (and therefore cooperation). Otherwise, there would be little need for such a comprehensive industry response.
I then use the comments of policymakers in the United States and EU to the illuminate the
role of preferences and implementation considerations in shaping these outcomes.
The Basel III agreements embody an “enhanced level of dynamism, complexity, and
interdependency within the global regulatory landscape” (Greenlee et al., 2011). This has
key effects on the way banks will conduct their future operations. Notably, common equity
requirements have more than doubled under Basel III, with the Tier 1 capital (i.e. common
shares and retained earnings) ratio rising from 2% to 4.5% (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2011). At the same time, Tier 2 capital (i.e. higher-risk assets) requirements
have been reduced and simplified, while Tier 3 capital (i.e. even higher-risk assets) has been
eliminated (Auer et al., 2011). All together, these measures lower the amount of capital that
can function as reserves. Meanwhile, Basel III raises the amount of risk-weighted assets2 a
bank must hold at any point in time (Harle et al., 2010).The overall outcome is that both the
quantity and quality of capital reserves have increased under the stipulation of Basel III. On
2 The term, “risk-weighted assets,” refers to the calculation of a bank’s minimum capital requirements based on
both the volume and risk of its holdings.
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top of this, Basel III requires that banks reduce their leverage and adhere to higher liquidity
standards.
The Basel III framework has profound effects on both individual banks and the greater
financial system. Most directly, the new regulations place significant pressure on bank profitability and return on investment. With higher capital requirements, banks face higher costs,
which in turn lower profitability and operating capacity. As a result, weaker banks are crowded out while those remaining are forced to revise their business models to ensure adequate
profit margins. On a macro level, Basel III will likely lower the lending capacity of the banking system, while reducing investor proclivity for bank debt and equity (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2011). This implies that Basel III carries deep and far-reaching
consequences for bank operations worldwide.
The vast majority of industry analysts and commentators in the United States and EU
agree that Basel III enacts significant and measurable reform. This is reflected in both the
profusion and content of analyst reports. Since the Basel III guidelines were issued in late
2010, many major consulting firms and government agencies have released detailed insights
on the implications for financial institutions. These reports consistently indicate that Basel
III alters significantly the capital requirements for banks in a way that reduces systemic risk,
but also hurts short-term bank profitability.
Considering that international consensus prior to Basel III called for capital adequacy
regulation that does exactly this, we can infer that the Basel agreements reflect a high degree
of transatlantic cooperation. Statement number 16 of the preamble to the G-20 Pittsburgh
Summit Communiqué pledges, “to make sure our regulatory system for banks and other
financial firms reins in the excesses that led to the crisis. Where reckless behavior and a lack
of responsibility led to crisis, we will not allow a return to banking as usual” (“Full G-20
Communiqué, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,” 2009). From recent analyst reports on the American and European banking industries, we know that policymakers have
stayed true to their word. How did this fruitful cooperation arise? The answer lies in the
details of the capital adequacy issue itself, as well as the similarity of regulatory preferences
and capabilities among jurisdictions.
Any praise of cooperation in capital adequacy reform must be qualified by the relative
simplicity of addressing the problem. The technical aspects of raising capital requirements
are relatively uncomplicated, and markedly simpler than other aspects of financial regulation.
While assessing capital adequacy involves intricate financial models, the technical nature of
capital adequacy reform does not extend much further beyond these computations. Consequently, Basel III regulators found it comparatively easy to institute meaningful and effective
regulatory measures. The straightforwardness of introducing a capital adequacy solution is
a key factor in explaining the efficacy with which regulators have cooperated on the issue.
Another reason for the successful cooperation observed in the Basel III agreements is
the relative homogeneity of preferences between jurisdictions. At a time coincident with
the completion of Basel III, both the United States and the EU witnessed discourse with
similar stipulations to those of the Basel Accords. In testimony before the Federal Reserve
Board a few months prior to the finalization of Basel III, Chairman Ben Bernanke made the
following statement, “Basel III should make the financial system more stable and reduce the
likelihood of future financial crises by requiring these banks to hold more and better-quality
capital and more-robust liquidity buffers” (Bernanke, 2011). In Europe, as early as 2009, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso described the need for new capital
Transatlantic Cooperation in Financial Regulation Post-2008
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safeguards. In delineating a set of European Commission proposals, he noted, “these proposals aim to ensure that banks hold enough capital to reflect the true risks they are taking…supervisors will be given the powers to take measures, including increased capital requirements,
to address any failures…” (European Commission, 2011). Such statements on the part of key
policymakers in each jurisdiction point to a shared predisposition towards capital adequacy
reform, and in particular, improvements in risk-weighted capital requirements.
While the creation of the Basel III framework has seen impressive cooperation among
American and European regulators, this cooperation may yet prove incomplete. Indeed,
despite being the best example of international regulatory cooperation, the agreements are
likely to suffer from asymmetric implementation. A simple principal-agent approach can
demonstrate that Basel III cooperation, though significant, may be stronger in principle than
in practice. We can assume first that the domestic financial industry has some degree of lobbying power over policymakers. Moreover, any implementation of Basel requirements occurs
solely through the domestic policy sphere. Based on this, it is possible to see why regulators
might promote stringent requirements at the international level, before legislators defect
at the stage of domestic implementation. This allows for, “regulatory arbitrage,” a situation
where divergent implementation creates excess profits for one region’s financial industry at
the expense of another’s (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).The financial institutions that benefit are the ones in the jurisdiction where implementation is relatively lax.
This emerged as a legitimate concern as regulators approach the first Basel III deadline
(January 1st, 2013). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s early assessments of the
EU and United States found “key areas where domestic implementation may be weaker than
globally agreed standards” (Brundsen, 2012). A Basel III progress report from the Bank for
International Settlements similarly found the EU and United States to be lagging in both
timely implementation and consistency with regulatory requirements (Bank for International Settlements, 2012). In addition, accounts of inconsistent implementation of Basel III
have recently propagated through news sources and analyst reports. It is difficult to argue
that the EU and United States have a lower implementation capacity than jurisdictions that
have been more compliant, such as Australia and Switzerland. Therefore, it is likely that the
financial sector is exercising some sort of lobbying power over the policy process, in the
interest of maintaining profit margins.
Evidently, the depth and scope of cooperation in capital adequacy reform can be understood in terms of the simplicity of the issue area, uniformity of preferences, and incentives to defect. The broad agreement between jurisdictions on the need for capital adequacy
reform, coupled with the fact that solutions to the capital adequacy problem are relatively
uncomplicated, have allowed for a robust international regulatory framework. Basel III engenders meaningful reform in the American and European banking sectors, creating important safeguards against systemic risk. Nonetheless, regulatory cooperation in this context is
constrained somewhat by implementation asymmetries, which arise from the combination
of strong financial industry lobbies and potential profits from defection. Still, the Basel III
requirements represent the most substantive transatlantic reform to emerge from the global
financial crisis.
Section 2: Derivatives
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from the 2008 financial crisis was the need to increase
oversight in global derivatives markets. Prior to the crisis, derivatives trading in both the
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2013/iss1/7
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United States and EU remained largely unregulated, allowing for vast speculation that produced enormous systemic risk. The most well-known example is the trading of mortgagebacked securities and credit default swaps, which amplified the real estate bubble and resulted
in spectacular losses as well as the collapse of major financial institutions once housing prices
declined (“A Long Road to Regulating Derivatives,” 2012). While derivatives serve the important functions in financial markets of hedging risk and price discovery (Jicking & Miller,
2011), derivatives markets must be structured in a way that limits risk-taking and asset price
uncertainty.
The key issue in transatlantic derivatives regulation is the mitigation of systemic risk
through the promotion of transparency and protection against market abuse.The initial focus
of these efforts was credit default swaps, as these contributed to the downfall of AIG, but
quickly transitioned to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, which face far less regulation
and were central to the demise of Lehman Brothers (Green & Jennings-Mares, 2011). Since,
an international consensus has arisen from the G-20 Financial Stability Board regarding
measures to be taken in regulating derivatives markets. These include standardizing derivatives contracts, establishing central clearing counterparties, moving OTC derivatives trading
onto exchanges or electronic platforms, and requiring participants to report activities to
trade repositories (G-20 Financial Stability Board, 2010).
Despite this consensus, derivatives markets present massive challenges to regulatory
coordination. First, the sheer complexity of derivatives trading is itself a hindrance to coordinated oversight. Moreover, variation among jurisdictions in such factors as the size and
nature of the derivatives market, the key participants, local market practice, and political
considerations, as well as many others, has rendered an international derivatives framework
akin to Basel III all but impossible to achieve. Therefore, transatlantic oversight of derivatives
markets is best understood in terms of the convergence of American and European regulatory efforts.
In the United States and EU, derivatives regulation takes the form of two overarching pieces of legislation. On the American side, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act specifies a
derivatives overhaul, with a host of new measures for standardizing trade in these financial
instruments. Such modifications include central clearing and reporting, regulation of market
participants, margin requirements, and position limits (Huntington, 2010). On the European
side, the Commission has enacted the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR),
which, combined with the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II),
aims to standardize trade in OTC derivatives through similar mechanisms (European Commission, 2010). These parallel frameworks embody a convergent regulatory response to the
derivatives issue between jurisdictions. The fact that both carry the objective of increasing
the transparency and efficiency of derivatives markets is an important positive outcome in
transatlantic financial regulation. Still, in order to determine the scope of these measures and
the extent of policy convergence, we must examine the derivatives issue area in more detail.
In September 2009, G-20 leaders proclaimed in Pittsburgh, “All standardized OTC
derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts
should be subject to higher capital requirements” (“G-20 Pittsburgh Summit Communiqué,” 2009). Articulated here, the goal is to make the positions of traders, the volume and
aggregate risk of derivatives trading, and the price of derivative assets transparent. Another
Transatlantic Cooperation in Financial Regulation Post-2008
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regulatory tool that has found its way into the policy discourse is the use of position limits,
which cap the number of derivatives contracts an investor can hold in connection with one
underlying security. All together, these measures aim to curb speculation and reduce the level
of systemic risk that originates from derivatives markets.
Both American and European legislation target this goal through similar means, suggesting that a degree of policy convergence certainly exists. This arises from a desire on each
side, as echoed by G-20 leaders, to prevent the recurrence of speculative bubbles and opaque
OTC positions leading to financial crises. In a statement regarding new European derivatives
oversight, EU Commissioner Michel Barnier described it as “a key step in our effort to establish a safer and sounder regulatory framework for European financial markets” (European
Commission, 2010). In a 2010 statement on the Dodd-Frank Act, Chris Dodd, United States
Senator and co-author of the legislation, noted, “the American people have called on us to
set clear rules of the road for the financial industry to prevent a repeat of the financial collapse that cost so many so dearly. This bill meets that challenge…we have closed loopholes
in regulations and required greater transparency and accountability for over-the-counter
derivatives…” (United States Senate, 2010). Such parallel proclamations from policymakers
on either side explain why the two jurisdictions have developed similar stipulations with
respect to derivatives oversight.
Nonetheless, whereas the statutory components of derivatives reform in the United
States and EU are fairly congruent, implementation and rulemaking activity have diverged
significantly since the new frameworks were enacted. In terms of the issue area itself, the vast
complexity of derivatives markets and oversight has led regulators on each side to encounter
considerable problems and uncertainty. As a result, rulemaking activity has lagged behind
deadlines, and in some cases has been inconsistent with statutory provisions. This explains a
significant portion of the divergence in implementation. At a structural level, we observe that
differences in the regulatory process between the jurisdictions have contributed to further
divergence. Additionally, as with capital adequacy reform, derivatives oversight comes with
an incentive to defect as financial actors stand to gain from regulatory arbitrage.This has also
contributed to divergent rulemaking.
Derivatives regulation has an immense number of elements, with substantial difficulties
arising in each. One area that has proven tricky and problematic is that of central clearing
counterparties. Regulators have faced the challenge of determining which end-users and
financial entities should be subject to clearing obligations. In the United States, the solution
is that the clearing requirement applies to anyone trading an eligible contract, yet certain
non-financial entities may be exempt when engaging in hedging activities. The EU maintains an exemption based on the magnitude of the non-financial entity’s derivatives position
(Lambert et al., 2011), rather than the nature of the position (whether or not it is employed
for hedging purposes). This is a technical discrepancy that stems from the intricacy of derivatives markets and signifies variation in the level of reform. The European approach likely
represents more effective oversight; a position limit accomplishes the goal of curtailing risk
without the need to create distinct definitions for hedging and speculation. In practice, the
line between the two types of derivatives positions is difficult to demarcate, as hedging can
often easily disguise speculative bets (Kelleher, 2012).
Another area of complexity is the extraterritorial impact of derivatives reform. In connection with commodity-based derivatives, the Dodd-Frank Act targets all swaps that have
a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce in the United
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2013/iss1/7
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States.” Meanwhile, the EMIR and MiFID II apply to OTC derivatives contracts that have
“a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU” (Dening et al., 2012). The global
interconnectedness of derivatives trading has given rise to a situation where different rules
apply to the operations of European financial entities in US markets and the operations of
American financial entities in European markets. This marks a failure of regulatory harmonization, and is an issue that will have to be addressed in the near future through transatlantic
coordination.
The divergence of implementation in the two jurisdictions is also due to structural
and institutional differences in the way regulation works. One of the key differences between the American and European approaches is in the assignment of rulemaking powers.
The Dodd-Frank Act grants regulatory agencies, such as the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), wideranging authority to create the necessary rules and define requirements pursuant to the Act.
For instance, it bestows the designated agencies with primary responsibility in developing
the organizational and business conduct standards to be required of central counterparties
and trade repositories. The EU framework, by contrast, provides less authority to regulatory
agencies, and instead directs them simply to enforce predefined technical standards (Latysheva, 2012).The delegation of authority in the American framework allows regulators some
freedom to implement policy in a manner inconsistent with the letter of the law. In the rule
defining “swap dealers” and “major swap participants,” the SEC and CFTC have included an
exemption for swap dealer activity that hedges commercial risk. However, the Dodd-Frank
Act stipulates a hedging exemption only for major swap participants, but not for swap dealers (Kelleher, 2012). In this manner, the structural mechanisms of regulation in the United
States have the potential to undermine some aspects of derivatives oversight, while causing
American reforms to diverge from their European counterparts.
Finally, as in the case of Basel III, derivatives regulation is affected by regulatory arbitrage. In both the United States and EU, derivatives reform has a significant impact on the
profitability of financial institutions, according to analyst reports (Margolin & Henderson,
2010). Therefore, tougher derivatives rules in the United States are likely to push financial
profits overseas and vice versa (Protess, 2011). In other words, policy convergence is inhibited
by an incentive to defect. Implementation failures such as the one pertaining to swap dealer
hedging in the United States, as well as the general slowness of implementation in the EU
(Felsenthal, 2012), are likely due in part to financial industry resistance to the OTC derivative overhaul. Certainly, regulators are aware of the problem of regulatory arbitrage and have
expressed concern over the implications of rulemaking asymmetries (Walter, 2012).
Derivatives regulation, then, has seen significant convergence in the frameworks for
oversight, but subsequent divergence in implementation of reforms. The financial crisis exposed the free-for-all that has been the OTC derivatives market in both the United States
and the EU, and both jurisdictions have recognized the need to address this. This has led to
convergent outcomes in new derivatives legislation. At the G-20 level, policymakers have
expressed the need for internationally harmonized derivatives reform, a need that has been
emphasized by the interconnectedness of global derivatives markets and the phenomenon of
regulatory arbitrage. Despite this, regulation has diverged between the United States and EU
on account of the complexity of the derivatives issue, structural differences in oversight, and
the interests of the financial industry. For this reason, derivatives regulation resulting from
the 2008 financial crisis is less effective as a transatlantic regulatory response than the Basel
Transatlantic Cooperation in Financial Regulation Post-2008
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III agreements.
Section 3: Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“Too Big to Fail”)
The most politically charged consequence of the 2008 financial crisis was the failure
and subsequent bailout of major financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, AIG, and Citigroup. These institutions were believed to be “too big to fail,” meaning that their financial
holdings were so great that their collapse would spread to counterparties throughout the financial system and cause widespread panic. This view was probably correct, seeing as the fall
of Lehman Brothers (which was not bailed out) had severe ramifications, while the bailout
of certain institutions prevented large-scale financial disintegration. At the same time, these
events illuminated the need to regulate SIFIs, such that governments (and taxpayers) are not
handcuffed by an obligation to save “too big to fail” institutions if and when they go under.
The international consensus on TBTF regulation is centered around the need to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with SIFIs. It involves a new transatlantic
standard for resolving the failure of SIFIs and new requirements for SIFIs to have additional
loss absorption capacity, as well as more intensive and effective supervision of all SIFIs at
the national and international level (G-20 Financial Stability Board, 2011). Such measures
are intended to reduce the likelihood of SIFI failure, lower the impact of failure, and shift
the burden of failure from taxpayers to the financial institutions themselves (Freeman et al.,
2011). Considering that most SIFIs are multinational corporations whose financial activity is
global in scope, international cooperation is an essential aspect of TBTF reform.
In the United States and EU, the key regulatory tool to safeguard against SIFI failure
has been the requirement of “living wills” (known also as resolution and recovery plans, or
RRPs).These are plans drafted by individual financial institutions in concordance with regulators that provide for “rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress
or failure.” (Smith et al., 2011). The goal is to minimize the financial disruption caused by
such an event, while also protecting taxpayers from the obligation to finance SIFIs in situations of distress. From the range of possible responses to the TBTF problem, living wills have
been pursued most strongly by American and European policymakers. In fact, the bulk of
legislative proposals pertaining to SIFIs center on crisis management through recovery and
resolution frameworks3.
Progress on living wills (and the TBTF question in general) has been fairly uneven
between the two jurisdictions, as construction of the EU framework has lagged significantly,
owing mainly to the European sovereign debt crisis (Price & Khalique, 2012). For this
reason, the analysis here will focus primarily on the debate regarding SIFI regulation, and
determine why meaningful transatlantic agreements have yet to take form. An examination
of the comments and proposals brought forth on the TBTF issue reveals that the major obstacles are structural and institutional heterogeneity. In addition, policymakers everywhere
have struggled with TBTF as a vastly complex regulatory concern.
The largest structural obstacle to convergence in SIFI regulation is the need to maintain policy coordination and consistency among EU member states. Considering that the
EU has not quite attained the status of fiscal federalism, it must take into account the legal
separateness of the entities involved in SIFI resolution plans (Nieto, 2009). Several EU members have created their own resolution tools, while the European Commission has been slow
3 Based on summaries of US and EU legislation from: Dodd Frank and Related Reforms, Morrison & Foerster
LLP (See note 1); EU Response to the Economic and Financial Crisis, European Commission.
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to develop an overarching framework. The United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority
drafted its RRP proposals one year ahead of the European Commission (“Living Wills in the
UK,” 2012), and these proposals have already reached the preliminary stages of implementation (Huw, 2012). Spain has independently established the Fund for Orderly Restructuring
of Banks, which acts as an insurance agent and provides financial restructuring to failing
banks (G-20 Financial Stability Board, 2012). Other European countries have put in place
different resolution measures, so while there has been progress in the EU with respect to
living wills, it has been frayed and inconsistent across member states.
Given that cross-border banking accounts for a massive proportion of financial flows
within the EU, regulatory disparities among member states inhibit Europe’s ability to tackle
the TBTF question. Dexia and Fortis, the largest European financial institutions to fail over
the course of the crisis, had engaged in expansive cross-border activity. Moreover, foreign assets make up over half of the holdings of major institutions such as Deutche Bank, Santander,
and UniCredit (Franklin et al., 2011). Therefore, in order to create meaningful reform, a
comprehensive living wills solution must be orchestrated at the EU level. This means that
only an EU-wide framework would be comparable to the RRPs instituted in the United
States under the Dodd-Frank Act. Still, without a harmonized insolvency regime and a single
supervisory authority for cross-border financial institutions, the best the European Commission can do is to construct a coordination framework based on common resolution tools and
an obligation to consult and cooperate when problems arise (Green et al., 2011).
Beyond structural constraints, TBTF reform and the introduction of living wills have
proven to be hugely complex policy issues. At the very core is the problem of defining size,
interconnectedness, and systemic importance. In other words, it is extremely challenging for
policymakers to determine what constitutes a financial institution whose failure would cause
larges-scale economic disruption, and hence must put together an RRP. Then, there is also
the question of what makes for an adequate living will for a given SIFI. Various methods
and financial models can be used in attempts to resolve these uncertainties, but none provide
obvious answers (Goldstein & Véron, 2011).
Though the TBTF issue has seen the least coordinated and significant international
response, it has perhaps the greatest potential for successful implementation. In the case
of living wills, preferences towards regulation are not tied to financial industry incentives.
The introduction of living wills does not directly impact the operations and profitability of
financial institutions (Freeman et al., 2011), and therefore does not generate an incentive to
defect from regulatory commitments. As a result, there is little reason to fear the problem of
asymmetric implementation with respect to any future cooperation or policy convergence
in the realm of RRPs. Rather, if the policy challenges posed by the complexity of living wills
and structural constraints are overcome, the changes that ensue are likely to be meaningful
and long-lasting. This may enhance transatlantic financial stability by limiting the contagion
effects from the failure of large financial players.
Conclusion
The regulatory challenges presented by the 2008 global financial crisis have been immense. The collapse unveiled deep structural flaws in the financial system, which have generated high levels of systemic risk and led to massive disruption of financial intermediation.
Owing to the interconnectedness of financial markets, this problem has necessitated an international policy response. Specifically, transatlantic regulatory cooperation, or at least policy
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convergence among jurisdictions, has proven key to ensuring the future stability of the global
financial system. If the EU, for instance, were to enhance macroprudential oversight while
the United States did not, the EU would not achieve financial stability. A major shock to
American banks could easily be transmitted to Europe, as was the case in 2008. Accordingly,
a situation of policy asymmetry, or regulatory arbitrage, is to be avoided.
Transatlantic cooperation in financial regulation has been mixed in depth and scope,
depending on the issue area. Reform in capital adequacy requirements has seen meaningful cooperation. Basel III is an overarching, far-reaching framework that requires banks to
change their operations significantly in order to lower their overall risk. Nonetheless, it may
yet prove ineffective since implementation lies in the hands of individual jurisdictions whose
incentives may undermine new capital adequacy regulation. In derivatives, meanwhile, a fair
amount of policy convergence has been observed, though the complexity of the derivatives
issue and structural differences in rulemaking have generated considerable uncertainty. Furthermore, as with capital adequacy regulation, countervailing incentives may weaken derivatives reform. Finally, the “too big to fail” concern has mostly vexed international regulators,
due to the remarkable complexity of the problem as well as structural differences between
the United States and the EU. Despite this, living wills proposals appear to be a useful regulatory tool with potential for future success.
It is imperative that transatlantic efforts to institute financial regulation accomplish
significant reform. In the United States and EU, the financial industry has exerted exorbitant political influence for too long, resulting in risky practices that have jeopardized the
proper functioning of the economy. Though not all elements of regulatory reform are as
straightforward as capital adequacy requirements, and preferences among jurisdictions are
not everywhere consistent, regulators must make sure they get it right. Through deeper cooperation, the United States and EU should be able to prevent the recurrence of crippling
financial collapse.
Author's Notes
Special thanks to Professor J. Nicholas Ziegler for research advice and guidance.
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